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Summary: In 1995, the countries of the European Union (EU15)1 were populated 
by 379.5 million inhabitants; out of them 22.8 million were foreigners –6% of the 
total population. On January 1, 2008, the number of foreigners living within 
EU15’s borders surpassed 29 millions, roughly 7.4% of the total population of the 
fifteen EU-core countries. In absolute terms, the countries with the greatest 
number of foreign residents were Germany (7.3 millions), Spain (5.3 millions), the 
United Kingdom (4.0 millions), France (3.7 millions), and Italy (3.4 millions). More 
than 75% of the foreign citizens in the EU27 (see figure 1) lived in these member 
states2.  
 
In no country of the European Union, with the exception of Latvia, has the 
number of foreign residents decreased during the 1995-2008 period. In some 
countries the growth of the number of foreign residents has been spectacular. 
The rise in Spain has been outstanding: it started in ninth place and is now 
second only to Germany in absolute numbers. In relative terms, Spain’s 
immigrant population is much more significant –all of the countries having an 
greater immigrant density than Spain are small countries, region size, with 
populations less than 10 million.. 
 
This article describes, grosso modo, this immigration process and analyses its 
causes, as well as its effects in the European culture and civilization. 
 
Keywords: Current international migrations, Immigration demographics in 
Europe, Economic migrations, Labor markets, Immigration policies.  
                                                 
1 Building on the European Community, the Maastricht treaty (1992/93) established The 
European Union, EU12: Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal (figure 1.a). By 1995, Austria, Sweden 
and Finland joined the European Union, becoming EU15 (figure 1.b). The second 
extension of the European Union, EU25, took place in 2004, incorporating Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and 
Greek Cyprus (figure 1.b). Finally, in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria entered the European 
Union, EU27 (figure 1.b). 
 . 
2Graphic design: Jesús Monge Sánchez and Andrés Rodríguez Blanco. 
  
 
2 
 
3 
1. Introduction 
 
It is impossible to cover in just one article, in the space normally alloted by 
the publishers of the current academic journals, even a significant part of 
the many and complex aspects that relate to the title of this essay. 
However, we believe that the title of this article sets an appropriate 
framework for the reflections that follow. Besides, the title itself, “Back to 
Europe”, may catch the attention of social scientists that will soon realize 
that we are referring to the recent arrival in Europe of great numbers of 
immigrants who, coming from around the world, are mirroring the 
historical expansion of Europe in colonial times. The age-old outbound 
migrations from Europe have reversed their course during the second 
half of the 20th century.  
 
In fact, this process of migration reversal (Cebrián et al. 2008a) is among 
the most important social events to happen in Europe since the end of the 
Second World War until today. It was made possible by the revolution in 
transportation and communications, in conjunction with the socio-
economic collapse of much of Africa and Latin America and, more recently, 
the crumbling of the Soviet Block. 
 
In previous centuries, European emigration had a tremendous impact on 
the indigenous populations of colonized spaces, causing their almost 
complete extinction in Australia and North America. In Latin America, the 
European stock was mixed with aboriginals, as well as with African slaves 
and Asian laborers, that Europeans redistributed throughout the world, 
from the Caribbean Sea to islands on the Pacific Ocean.  
 
In the second half of the 20th century, however, European populations 
have withdrawn from many of those areas, leaving behind a set of more 
homogenous populations. A number of countries outside of Europe, and 
historically cosmopolitan cities such as Alexandria or Istanbul, have 
evolved towards positions that are culturaly and racially more homogenous 
since the departure of Britishs, Frenchs, Greeks, Jews, and other groups. 
Meanwhile, a reverse process of diversification has taken place with the 
arrival of new immigrants who are transforming Berlin, London, Madrid, 
Barcelona, etc. Migration towards Europe from peripheral countries has 
brought about a racial and ethnic variety that had not existed before.  
 
Going back to Europe is not the same for the people who have some roots 
in the European country where they are coming to settle now. Those 
groups may have mixed feelings about the migration process that affect 
their behaviour in the country of destination. Going back to Europe may 
mean to these persons something like going back home, which always 
makes the adventure less striking. On the other hand, it may prove hard 
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for them to accept that their future is to be found in the land their 
ancestors left behind to look for a better life somewhere else. 
 
When many European populations stopped to grow several decades ago, 
immigrants from neighboring areas and former European colonies were 
welcomed. Programs were established to recruit temporary workers to fill 
job offers that were not taken by nationals. Eventually, many among these 
immigrants settled down and claimed to reunify their families left behind. 
 
In the EU and in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries, with few exceptions, foreign immigration 
contributes more to population growth than natural growth (figures 2–4). 
Indeed, the map of the natural population growth rates by country in 
Europe (figure 3) is the opposite map of net migration therein (figure 4). 
Since the March 2000 publication of the much-heralded report by the 
Population Division of the United Nations on the necessity for a massive 
immigration to Europe, there has been much talk about ‘replacement 
migration’ as the only way out of the current European demographic crisis 
(i.e. population ageing and, eventually, depopulation). 
 
However, according to Coleman (2002) and others, while immigration can 
prevent the decrease in population, only an unprecedented and 
unsustainable immigration regime would unleash a significant growth, 
displacing the original population from its former majority position 
(Saczuk, 2003). For these authors, the solution to the problem of an ageing 
European population does not necessarily follow the promotion of 
immigration.  
 
The truth is that immigrants are filling a demographic void. They fill the 
streets and employment offices. They are found at work, especially in jobs 
that require very little training. Immigrants come to fill a position that is 
more advantageous for them than remaining in their countries of origin.  
 
 
2. The causes 
 
In order to understand the current migration towards Europe, it is 
necessary to keep in mind the global trends in international migration and 
its most important factors, such as a growing economic integration. 
Integration has a vertical component that, in principle, facilitates the 
concentration of people and activities. Economic integration is responsible 
for the appearance, and later growth, of important clusters of immigrants.  
 
Globalization, however, has an horizontal dimension, demonstrating         
the widening of economic and social relations, through greater reach of the
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
media and transportation. Economic integration and globalization favor 
the movement of people while, in turn, are affected by them. 
In the current system of production we are witnessing a spectacular 
concentration in the financial sector, which is represented by the merge of 
larger and larger companies. Manufacturing plants, however, tend to be 
located in the periphery where it is possible to find low-cost labor and less 
stringent environmental regulations. One of the reasons why Europe is so 
interested in international migrations is that this injection of low-cost 
labor allows it to maintain competitiveness in some production lines (that, 
usually, would only be found in developing countries), without losing its 
comparative advantage on investment safety; since capital owners or 
managers are sometimes willing to pay a little more in salaries if social 
order is guaranteed. This greater remuneration for work will be 
incorporated into the price of the final product. 
 
Economic integration and globalization are often responsible for the 
attraction of foreign labor towards certain enclaves, and the removal of the 
native population from others. In Europe and Latin America there are 
numerous recent examples of each case. 
 
In addition, current geopolitical tendencies have led to major changes in 
the nature of international migration. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 
has shifted westwards many Central and Eastern Europeans, who formerly 
gravitated towards Moscow. Fortunately, this new migration flow has not 
become the great and uncontrolled flight that many predicted. In the 
Balkan region, the demise of the Soviet Union unleashed a smoldering war 
of an ethnic-territorial nature.  Other armed conflicts, in Africa and Asia, 
primarily, induced waves of millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and refugees in neighboring countries, and movements of refugees in the 
free world, especially in Western Europe3. To neutralize those moves, the 
developed countries have undertaken humanitarian and military actions 
for post-war recovery and development. 
 
At the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, a period of great economic 
growth and immigration reached its peak in countries of the West4. 
Thereafter, in 2002 there was a change in economic conditions 
                                                 
3 Although the arrival of massive numbers of refugees reached a peak at the beginning of 
the 90s with the crisis of Yugoslavia, many European countries (such as France, 
Germany, UK, etc.) continue to receive refugees in great numbers. Most refugees are 
coming from Afghanistan, China, Iraq and Turkey. The UN High Commission on Refugees 
published in 2004 that the number of asylum petitions received by Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK (339,500) were more than those 
individual and collective petitions received by Canada and the USA combined (70,800). 
4 Active recruitment of skilled workers in Ireland, Korea, New Zealand, UK and USA 1990-
2002; movement of workers for multinationals (USA 300,000/year, the next country was 
UK with 18,000/year); movement of unqualified workers to France, Spain, UK, USA, etc.  
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(decreasing, or stabilizing, GDP and increasing unemployment) in these 
countries. Nonetheless, even in these circumstances, immigration did not 
become stagnant. It seems as if the international economic recession was 
not able of shutting off immigrants. In our opinion, this fact has at least 
two explanations. In the first place, the inertia of the call signal, which is 
similar to any other process of dissemination of information, leading to 
frequent mismatches between supply and demand for work. Family 
reunification, which can represent 50% of immigrants to countries such as 
Canada, France, USA, and the Scandinavian countries, is a kind of a 
lagged migration effect. The other explanation is that the economic and 
social situation that prevails in many countries of the world is so extreme, 
that is not going to stop the departure of individuals towards Europe, 
North America and other “islands of development” regardless of the 
conditions of the receiving countries, which will almost always be better 
than the conditions in the countries of origin. During this period, some 
countries continue to receive many immigrants, like most Western 
European countries, USA, Canada and New Zealand. 
 
In developed countries, there has also been a “human rights revolution”, 
which attracts people from countries less-favored in economic and 
humanitarian terms. The governments of developed countries have 
imposed upon themselves and their citizens almost limitless human rights, 
like those found in the European Convention on Human Rights (1948) and 
the Geneva Convention (1951 and 1967) as well as guarantees that are 
applicable to citizens of other countries. In several international 
agreements, the balance of competencies has gradually shifted in favor of 
the judicial power and to the detriment of the executive, indirectly 
questioning the principle of national sovereignty. Within the European 
Union, this process has been accelerated by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997-99), which brought immigration issues closer to the Commission in 
Brussels, and away from intergovernmental agreements, likening the 
rights of future immigrants and those of citizens of the European Union. 
The right to family reunification, which we mentioned above, is now a 
universally accepted fact and is now responsible for nearly half of the 
immigrants entering developed countries.  
 
However, European labor markets have shown themselves enormously 
rigid in adapting to the new conditions of uninterrupted economic growth 
in the West over more than a decade. Native-born workers (who are 
protected by the institutions and culture of the welfare state, including 
unemployment subsidies and EU Convergence Program Funds) have seen 
the growth of low-pay and low-qualification jobs filled by immigrants who 
have largely had to pay the price of being illegal for a certain time. 
Coleman (2003), quoting Salt (2001) argues that there exists a vast 
consortium of institutions with an interest in international migration: 
 
10 
governments and the private sector, including multinational companies, as 
well as the informal and irregular sectors.  
 
 
3. Current migrations into Europe  
 
The evolution of net immigration to the entirety of the EU15 shows a 
cyclical behavior with peaks in 1962, 1980, 1992 and 2003, and lows in 
1970 and 1982. In theory there should exist a time lag between the 
economic cycle and the immigration cycle. However, in recent years, it is to 
be noted that, regardless of the fluctuations of the economy, immigration 
continued to increase until the end of the year 2008.  
 
According to the European Statistical Agency (EUROSTAT, 2005), 
immigration to the EU maintained high quotas at the beginning of the 
1990s, reaching the level of 1.3 million immigrants per year in 1993, while 
falling to 378,687 yearly immigrants in 1998. Reasons for this massive 
immigration at the beginning of the 1990s were the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the war in the Balkans. Nonetheless, a much more important wave of 
refugees from Central and Eastern Europe was expected since the break-
up of the Soviet Union; fortunately, this did not occur. In Germany, as of 
1989, many people of German ancestry (Aussiedler) came from the East, 
claiming their rights to German nationality, at a rate that varied from 
220,000 in 1993 to 135,000 in 1997. As far as applicants for asylum are 
concerned (EUROSTAT1999, ACNUR1999), numbers were large until 1993 
(672,381 in 1992, during the war in the Balkans), with a spike in 1999 
(430,000, from Kosovo). In 1995, according to Eurostat statistics, the 
EU15 had a total population of 379.5 million inhabitants, while 22.8 
million of these were foreigners – a 6% of the total population. 
 
For more than a decade, two large groups of countries receiving 
immigrants to Western Europe can still be distinguished: Southern Europe 
and North-Central Europe. Between the two groups there exists an 
immigration time lag of several decades. Immigrants living in Southern 
Europe tend to be younger and with a greater disequilibrium as to sex 
than those of North-Central Europe. Immigration from Latin America and 
Africa is much greater in Southern Europe, while immigration from East 
Europe is less important. However, this fact has changed in recent years. 
For instance, the Romanian community in Spain has become the second 
largest in Spain (524,995) since January 2007, and the Bulgarians moved 
to 10th place (121,611), ahead of Chinese and Peruvians (Spanish 
Statistical Bureau-INE).  Spain was leading the nations of Europe in terms 
of annual net immigration rates as of 2003. The rate was remarkably high: 
1.76%. Only Cyprus (1.72%) and Italy (1.04%) were close. 
 
 
11 
In several statistical publications on EU25 countries, covering the period 
2002-2004, the percentage of foreign residents with respect to the total 
population varies widely from 0.6% in Slovakia to 39% in Luxembourg. 
Nonetheless, the majority of the countries are placed in the 2-8% interval 
(table 1). Among those over 8% are Latvia, Estonia, Austria, Cyprus, 
Germany, Belgium, and Greece. The situation in Latvia and Estonia can be 
explained by the large number of former Soviet Union citizens (referred to 
as ‘recognized non-citizens’ of these two countries) who are permanently 
resident in these countries but have not acquired Latvian/Estonian 
citizenship or any other citizenship. The natives of Cyprus are ethnic 
Turks or Greeks, and communities of Greek or Turkish nationality are 
quite numerous. Austria and Greece have been, and continue to be, 
interface countries between Eastern and Western Europe; therefore, they 
have always had notable foreign communities throughout their history. 
Finally, Belgium and Germany are two examples of intense post-colonial 
and post-war (World War II) immigration. On the other hand, we find 
Hungary, Lithuania and Poland below 2%. These are very low figures, due 
to the fact that these countries only register permanent residents.  
 
If we look at the column ‘Most numerous foreign community’, in the same 
table, we come to the conclusion that migrations between EU countries are 
not as important as migration flows across the outer border of the 
European Union. Only in Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovakia, 
which are smaller countries, immigrants from EU countries are greater 
than those coming from other areas. However, most recent figures 
(EUROSTAT, 2009a) for the period 2001-2008, show that despite the 
absolute increase of non-EU foreigners in the countries of the European 
Union, their share in the total EU foreign population has fallen from 66.1% 
to 63%. This change in sharing does not necessarily mean that, strictly 
speaking, intra-EU flows are becoming more important in recent years. On 
the one hand the naturalization process alters the proportion non-EU 
nationals/EU nationals within the immigration stock. For instance, 
Germany granted citizenship to 260,000 Turks over the period 2001-2008. 
On the other hand, most significantly, the two EU enlargements that took 
place in 2004 and 2007 changed the category of those immigrants coming 
out of a dozen of European countries. The 2007 enlargement had a 
stronger impact along this line. 
 
On January 1, 2008, approximately 30.7 million foreigners lived in the 
European Union (EUROSTAT, 2009b), which meant approximately 6.2% of 
the total population of the area in question (figures 5, 6 and 7). In absolute 
terms, the countries with the largest number of foreign residents were: 
Germany (7.3 millions), Spain (5.3 millions), United Kingdom (4.0 millions) 
France (3.7 millions), and Italy (3.4 millions). 
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Table 1: National and Foreign Population in European Union countries: 1990 and 2004. 
 
 Year 
Nationals 
x1000 
Foreigners 
x1000 
Total pop. 
x1000 
Foreigners 
% Total pop. 
Most numerous foreign   
community Year  
Nationals 
x1000 
Foreigners 
x1000 
Total pop. 
x1000 
 Foreigners  
% Total pop. 
Belgium 2004 9536 860 10396 8,27241247 Italian 1990 9067 881 9948 8,85605147 
Netherlands 2004 15556 702 16258 4,31787428 Turkish 1990 14251 642 14893 4,31075002 
Luxembourg 2004 277 174 451 38,5809313 Portuguese 1990 270 109 379 28,7598945 
France   1999 55258 3263 58521 5,57577622 Portuguese  1990 53055 3597 56652 6,3492904 
Germany 2004 75190 7342 82532 8,89594339 Turkish 1990 74267 4846 79113 6,12541554 
Italy   2004 55898 1990 57888 3,43767275 Albanian 1990 56338 356 56694 0,62793241 
Denmark  2004 5126 271 5397 5,02130813 Turkish 1990 4985 151 5136 2,94003115 
Ireland 2002 3585 274 3859 7,10028505 British 1990 3426 81 3507 2,30966638 
UK    2003 55636 2760 58396 4,72635112  Irish 1990 55043 2416 57459 4,20473729 
Greece   2004 10149 891 11040 8,07065217 Albanian  1990 9979 142 10121 1,40302342 
Portugal  2003 10169 239 10408 2,29631053 Cape Verdean   1990 9819 101 9920 1,01814516 
Spain 2004 39426 2772 42198 6,56903171 Ecuadorian 1990 38428 398 38826 1,02508628 
EU12 (1986)  2004 335806 21538 357344 6,02724546   1990 328928 13720 342648 4,00410917 
Austria  2004 7375 765 8140 9,3980344 Serb-Montenegrin  1990 7211 434 7645 5,67691302 
Finland  2004 5113 107 5220 2,04980843 Russian  1990 4953 21 4974 0,42219542 
Sweden 2004 8500 476 8976 5,3030303 Finnish 1990 8071 456 8527 5,34771901 
EU15 (1995) 2004 356794 22886 379680 6,02770754   1990 349163 14631 363794 4,02178156 
Cyprus 2002 625 65 690 9,42028986 Greek  1992 577 26 603 4,31177446 
Czech Republic  2004 10016 195 10211 1,90970522 Ukrainian 1990 10327 36 10363 0,34738975 
Estonia  2000 1096 274 1370 20 Russian 1990     
Hungary 2004 9987 130 10117 1,2849659 Romanian 1995 10199 138 10337 1,33501016 
Latvia 2004 1804 515 2319 22,2078482 Russian  1998 1788 671 2459 27,2875153 
Lithuania    2001 3450 34 3484 0,97588978 Russian 1990     
Malta    2004 389 11 400 2,75 British 1990 352 6 358 1,67597765 
Poland 2002 37530 700 38230 1,83102276 German 1990     
Slovenia 2004 1951 45 1996 2,25450902 Bosnian 1995 1942 48 1990 2,4120603 
Slovakia 2004 5350 30 5380 0,55762082 Czech 1990     
EU25 2004 428992 24885 453877 5,48276295  1990     
Source. EUROSTAT 2004. 
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3.1. Latin American immigration to Southern Europe 
 
The influx of Latin American immigrants towards Spain in the first 
place, and to Italy and Portugal to a lesser extent, has certain specific 
characteristics on which we must comment. 
 
In Latin America, there have been other outflows of migrants before the 
late 1980s, and towards other destinations. The changes in destination 
of migrants have to do with the selective closing of certain American 
borders. Most important of all, the 1986 United States Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) determined much stricter controls that 
favored Asians over Latin Americans. 
 
Years of economic crisis in Latin America created impressive pockets of 
poverty (marginal population which had ceased to be unnoticed) and 
edged towards national bankruptcy in some cases, bringing about the 
precipitated departure of great numbers of migrants. The last three 
decades of the 20th century in Latin America proved to be a period of 
political tension, civil war, and dictatorship that ignited a flight towards 
Europe, a region of political stability and economic growth, where some 
Mediterranean countries provided a friendlier entry point.  
 
A set of cultural ties, coming from a common history, which result in 
the use of a common language helped the population transfer.  Latin 
Americans capitalized on their ability to speak Spanish, Portuguese or, 
some of them, little Italian, when reaching Southern Europe with the 
intention of staying there or looking for a foothold to take another leap.   
 
Table 2 and figure 8, gather some recent data distributed by Eurostat 
on the six most-represented nationalities among Latin American 
residents in the countries of the EU. 
 
 
3.1. Other significant ‘Back-to-Europe’ immigration flows. 
 
Although Latin American people, settling mostly in Sothern Europe, 
have been the fastest growing immigrant community in Europe for the 
last decade, other very remarkable inflows of people, coming recently 
from different areas worldwide, are worth noting here. According to 
Eurostat figures, the North African community, which still is the non-
European largest immigrant community in Europe, has grown by 
851,000 individuals, approximately, between 1998 and 2009, second 
only to 1,936,000 incoming South Americans. The North African flow 
has both traditional (France, Germany and the Low Countries) and new 
destinations (Spain and Italy). The latest ones are responsible for to the 
current enlargement of this immigrant community. 
 17 
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Table 2: Latin American immigration to the EU 
 
 
  Belgium 
(2003) 
Germany 
(2007) 
Spain 
(2007) 
France 
(1999) 
 Italy 
(2005) 
Netherlands 
(2007) 
Portugal 
(2003) 
Sweden 
(2007) 
UK (2005) Total 
Ecuador 1276 4830 433032 780 53220 730 158 631   494657 
Colombia 1280 10577 265878 5028 15843 2063 340 1750 22444 325203 
Brazil 2025 32273 91955 7234 25823 4209 24864 1854 24628 214865 
Bolivia 329 1979 204264 435 3637 226 36 767   211673 
Peru 878 9498 105318 3135 53378 986 222 1701   175116 
Argentina 367 4991 143573 2537 13720 571 517 466 2523 169265 
Chile 1275 6300 41598 4206 3320 1068 226 8144 874 67011 
Uruguay 81 667 46963 491 1575 88 89 283 0 50237 
Paraguay 82 1123 47124 143 580 36 24 38   49150 
Suriname 81 36 25 60 7 7561 4 3   7777 
Guyana 26 104 22 35 23 191 24 25 2061 2511 
Total 7700 72378 1379752 24084 171126 17729 26504 15662 52530 1767465 
Source: EUROSTAT 2007. 
 
West Africans are also to be considered, since they grew by more than 
half a million people during the same period, placing themselves as the 
third millionaire foreign community in Europe coming from another 
continent. West Africans are keeping their traditional destinations 
(France and the UK), but, recently, they are also moving to Spain and 
Italy. Eurostat (2009b) reports about 2,800,000 North Africans, 
2,300,000 South Americans and 1,006,000 West Africans established in 
Germany, France, UK, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Austria, Spain, Greece, Sweden and Portugal. 
 
Asians contributed to the outstanding growth of the foreign population 
in Europe in the last decade as well. East Asians (Chinese for the most 
part) arrived to Europe in big numbers (over 700,000 in 1998-2009). 
The same can be stated about South Asians (mostly Indians, Pakistanis 
and Sri Lankans), whose increment from 1998 till 2009, in the twelve 
above-mentioned countries, was close to 400,000 people, taking this 
foreign group over the one million mark. 
 
Figures 9.1 to 9.6 illustrate the relative importance of the most current 
immigration flows in Europe (Source: EUROSTAT, 2011). The database 
on citizenship of foreign residents kept by Eurostat does not include yet 
information on France and the United Kingdom after 2005. This is the 
reason why the line corresponding to their series was not extended till 
2009 in the following line charts. 
 
When dealing with citizenship data (instead of country-of-birth 
information) we have to be aware of the significance of naturalization in 
Europe for the last ten years or so. It happens that more than 5.5 
million people were naturalized in all EU member states in the 2001-
2008 period (Eurostat, 2010). Normally, naturalization has a greater 
impact in the class of former foreign residents. Therefore, in figures 9.1 
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Figure 9.1. SOUTH AMERICAN RESIDENTS
0
200.000
400.000
600.000
800.000
1.000.000
1.200.000
1.400.000
1.600.000
1.800.000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
T
O
T
A
L
Spain Italy PortGree BelGerFranNethAusSweUKSwi
 20 
FIGURE 9.2. CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN RESIDENTS
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FIGURE 9.3. NORTH AFRICAN RESIDENTS
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FIGURE 9.4. WEST AFRICAN RESIDENTS
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FIGURE 9.5. EAST ASIAN RESIDENTS
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FIGURE 9.6. SOUTH ASIAN RESIDENTS
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to 9.6, the older migration currents appear somewhat 
underrepresented.  
 
 
4. Demographic and gender issues 
 
There are important demographic and gender features that characterize 
current immigration to European countries. Such is the case of high 
demographic pressures in developing countries, as a result of high 
fertility rates, war and/or natural disasters. This situation coincides 
with the decline of birthrates in wealthy countries.  
 
In addition, due to the progressive liberation of women, it is increasingly 
common to find women who migrate independently. The rights of 
immigrant women are very often seriously violated with impunity. 
Migrant women are subjects to much greater risks than men.  
Addressing this problem requires strict and uncompromised 
determination. 
 
Let us look first at the major demographic outcomes of current 
immigration. If we take into account all the present EU member states 
(EU27), differences in age and gender structure between EU27 and 
immigrant populations are highly visible (EUROSTAT, 2006b). Under 20 
years old, age cohorts do not differ much: while 23% of the native 
population is under the age of 20, only 20% of the immigrant 
population is that old. The differences become noticeably among young 
adults cohorts. For instance, while only 14% of the EU27 population is 
between the ages of 24 and 34, 22% of the immigrant population falls 
into that group. Even more noticeable are the differences in the group 
‘65 years and more’ (17% for EU27 natives and 9% for immigrants). 
Immigration, without a doubt, has meant a rejuvenation of the 
European population; but without a continuous influx, the population 
will age again since the fertility behavior of immigrants tends to mimic 
that of the established population. Regarding gender composition,  all 
evidence suggests that the immigrants’ male-female ratio is significantly 
higher than the natives’. 
 
With the exception of France and Ireland, which have already a positive 
demographic rate, near generation replacement level, immigrants are 
undoubtely helping to maintain or increase population growth rates in 
all EU countries. The UN (United Nations, 2000) has projected that in 
the absence of immigration, the EU countries and Japan will lose 
between 10 and 14% of their population between 2000 and 2050. 
 
 "In many states, migration is the main component of 
population change. Consider for example the role of labor 
migration on the sustainability of healthcare and pension 
systems in aging societies. The statistics published by 
Eurostat on these topics are also useful to check the socio-
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economic inclusion of immigrants and the success of 
policies to prevent discrimination." (EUROSTAT, 2005, 
p.73) 
 
Seven population projections have been recently published (Coleman, 
2006; EUROSTAT, 2006a) for the 2004-2050 period, corresponding to 
different hypotheses about the evolution of fertility, mortality and 
migration rates. Out of the seven population projections, only the two 
that assume high levels of fertility and immigration achieve sustained 
population growth for the 2004-2050 period. On the other hand, 
without immigration the EU population will decrease in 2008. The 
immigration that we are witnessing will only delay the collapse of the 
EU population, but not prevent its occurrence. At least, this is the 
message of Eurostat (EUROSTAT, 2006a). 
 
The projections not only compute the total EU population, but some 
parameters of its structure as well. This is the case of the dependency 
rate of older people (those 65 and older/population aged 15-64). In 
2050, Spain could have nearly one person older than 65 for each active 
person –a very discouraging prospect. But the actual situation may be 
less dramatic since the projection assumes an average net immigration, 
while it is the case that great numbers of foreigners are coming to 
Spain.  For the total population of the EU this baseline projection 
represents a loss of 7 million people and, more importantly, a loss of 52 
million working population. It is clear then that immigration, by itself, 
does not assure a promising demographic future for Europe. The 
baseline projection simulates the entry of approximately 40 million 
persons into Europe throughout the projection period. Only those 
projections that consider the entry of 60 million, or more, assure 
maintenance of the European population by the middle of the 21st 
century. The greater part of this immigration is directed towards the 
countries of the EU15, but as we step further into the current century 
the new countries of the EU27 will receive more and more immigrants. 
 
 
5. Labor market 
 
Within the globalization process, the internationalization of labor 
markets has had a great impact with respect to prices and salaries. If 
workers in one state have suspicions that the workers from elsewhere 
can move to find work in that state, they will reduce their wage 
demands and therefore lower the costs of production and costs to 
consumers. Immigration serves to regulate the pressure of demand for 
labor, containing increases in salary levels. Globalization of labor 
markets have had a visible effect in Europe and in other industrialized 
areas, which have been able to contain inflationary pressures produced 
by increases in energy costs and other factors of production.  
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5.1. Supply and Demand for Immigrants 
 
Let us consider countries A and B, where ‘A’ offers higher salaries than 
‘B’ for workers of a certain professional category. Country A has a more 
advanced technology, more capital per person, more human capital, 
more natural resources per worker, and a political and legal system 
more favorable to economic growth. Let us suppose that the costs of 
migration and settlement – including information costs – are reduced, 
while the salaries in Country A increase and those in Country B 
decrease.5. In this situation, if the rate of return for investing in 
emigration is greater than the interest that individuals have to pay on 
loans received, there clearly exists an incentive for emigration.  
 
In a world without legal barriers, migration will continue until the rate 
of return is less than the discount rate, when there is no marginal 
benefit for migrating from Country B to Country A. In terms of supply 
and demand, the difference in salaries between ‘A’ and ‘B’ will 
correspond to the number of persons who are ready to emigrate. In 
figure 10, the equilibrium takes place at (m0, d0), i.e. at a m0 level of 
migration, corresponding to a d0 difference in salaries between ‘A’ and 
‘B’. 
 
 If there are legal barriers to immigration (m1 < m0), aside from the law, 
the attractiveness of migration and the outflow from Country B towards 
Country A is maintained, while the d1-d0 quantity is positive. Illegal 
migration is a response to international labor markets constraints that 
prevent the free movement of the factors of production, including work. 
 
We consulted recent historical series from the United Nations’ 
International Labor Organization in order to assess the current salary 
differential between Spain and Latin America. We identified the most 
relevant information, which happened to correspond to the year 2001, 
and performed some transformations of the data from this source. 
In the first place, we had to write down all of the salaries using the 
same unit of measurement: the price of one hour of work. Then, we had 
to translate all salaries into euros, since this agency always publishes 
its results in the unit of currency of each country in question (table 3). 
                                                 
5 The immediate costs of migration, for example the price of an airline ticket and the 
time spent in moving, do not constitute the most significant costs of international 
migration.  The greatest cost arises from leaving behind familiar people and places, 
settlement costs, the cost of not knowing the language, market, information and social 
networks of the destination, and the cost of acquiring these. All things being equal, it 
can be shown that emigrants choose destinations that minimize these costs, by 
developing, for instance, ethnic enclaves that are concentrations of immigrants. It is 
not that immigrants are more gregarious than the native-born but that they are 
seeking a mechanism for minimizing the costs of settling into the receiving society. 
These intangible costs, along with a high discount rate due to low salaries, explain 
why notable salary differences at the international and inter-regional scale continue to 
endure.  
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We were not able to find another year of full coverage for these 
countries, but we assume that the reader knows that this 
disequilibrium did not decline for the last seven years.  
 
Table 3: Salaries in Spain and some Latin American countries 
 
Country Hour of work 
Spain 9.02€ 
Argentina 4.73€ 
Brazil 2.84€ 
Chile 2.66€ 
Peru 0.95€ 
                  Source: ILO-UN, 2001. 
 
The supply of illegal immigrants is a growing function of salary 
differences. The higher the supply of illegal immigrants is, the lower its 
cost and lowers the chances of being arrested and fined. In neighboring 
countries, such as Morocco and Spain, salary differences are growing 
while the costs of illegal immigration have dropped. Thereafter 
incentives for illegal immigration have increased. The magnitude of 
illegal immigration, given a salary differential, depends on the 
permeability of the border and the acceptance by the receiving society. 
The flow of illegal immigration can be somewhat controlled by a system 
of arrests and fines, as well as deportation. Another way to control the 
flow of illegal immigrants into a country is to fine the employers who 
hire them. In this way, the cost of employing illegal immigrants is 
immediately increased because of the additional risk involved. 
  
Even while every human being has a right to emigrate from his own 
country, no person has the right to settle in any other particular 
country. On the other hand, up to now, countries have the right to 
manage the number and the characteristics of foreign immigrants 
seeking to settle within their territory. Countries have tried to control 
the demographic and cultural features of their own people, at least up 
until a certain point. Many developed countries favor the entry of 
persons with a historical, cultural, and ancestral patrimony that is 
similar to that of the natives – which can favor the process of 
integration.  
 
There exist, therefore, political and economic reasons for controlling 
immigrant entries to a country. From the political point of view 
immigrants, whether they may vote or not, can become aligned in such 
a way as to change to some degree the power that existed before their 
arrival. Immigrants can provoke tensions of an economic sort when they 
do not “mesh” perfectly with the system that receives them. They can 
cause congestion in some niches, taking more from the system than 
they produce and provoke negative external reaction, etc. 
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5.2. Native-born workers 
 
Does the arrival of foreign workers affect the median salary level in 
Spain at the beginning of the 21st century? Is it a positive or negative 
effect? The analysis by Martin (2005) on the economic consequences of 
immigration on the USA in the mid-1990s, based on a previous work by 
Smith and Edmonston (1997), seems relevant (Cebrián y Vázquez, 
2008b).  
 
From an economic point of view, Smith and Edmonston (1997) report 
that immigration affects:  
1. Employment of native-born 
2. Salaries of native-born 
3. International markets for goods and services 
4. Rate of economic growth 
5. Price of goods and services in the receiving country. 
 
By using a basic economic model, Smith and Edmonston (1997) 
conclude that immigration produces a net economic gain for the 
receiving country: 
1. Immigration increases the labor supply, as well as the production 
of new goods and services 
2. The salaries of immigrants are lower than the total of the sale of 
their production 
3. Immigrants accept less-desirable jobs than native-born, who can 
then be promoted.  
 
For example, the authors showed a drop of 1% to 2% in salaries in the 
USA during the 1980s in niches occupied by immigrants. During this 
period, the labor mass (labor supply) increased by 4%. 
 
The influence of immigration upon employment and salaries of the 
native-born tends to be distributed throughout the country without 
observable significant increases in the regions receiving more than the 
median amount of immigrants.  
 
Martin explained (2005) how the displacements towards the right of the 
labor supply curve defined two rectangles and one triangle (figure 11). 
The first of the two rectangles “C” represented the salary mass that 
native-born workers ceased to receive because of the descent of salaries 
that was brought about by the arrival of immigrant workers. However, 
this money does not “evaporate”: it is transferred to the owners of 
capital and land in the form of greater benefits and profits. The area of 
rectangle “D” corresponds to immigrants’ salaries. The area of triangle 
“B” is the surplus of the consumer that is not employed in the 
retribution of capital or land. Since it deals with a generic benefit, which 
has repercussions for all of the native-born population of the 
destination country, it can be called the “net benefit of immigration”. 
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In the case we mention, by calculating the area of Triangle B the 
participation of the net benefit of immigration to a nation’s wealth can 
be known. Area B = 1/2 (P0-P1) (X1-X0) = 1/2 (0.4$) x (15,000,000 
workers). In percentages, Area B = 1/2 (3% decrease in the price of labor 
due to immigration) x (11% participation of immigrant labor in the total 
USA labor force) x (70% participation of the salaries of the USA Gross 
Domestic Product) = 0.5 x 0.03 x 0.11 x 0.7 = 0.5 x 0.002 = 0.001 = 
0.1% del United States’ GDP in 1997 = 0.1% (8,000 billon dollars). 
Therefore, for that date the net immigration benefit for the USA was 
US$8 billion – an important figure in absolute terms.  
 
From that point of view, it is postulated that a liberalization of 
international migration should generate gains for the world economy 
that are much greater than those derived from liberalizing international 
trade. As proof, Martin (2005) mentions that while trade barriers that 
still hinder free trade between some regions of the world can duplicate, 
at the most, the prices of products exchanged, the salaries of workers of 
a given category in some countries can become as much as 10 times 
greater than elsewhere.   
 
International migration creates positive economic consequences 
because it permits a better allocation of man labor and makes possible 
an increase in production on a worldwide scale. Which individuals 
benefit from the general economics gains produced by the arrival of 
immigrants in a country? According to the most accepted economic 
theory, the benefits are distributed among the immigrants (their net 
income), the owners of capital and land, and the buyers of goods and 
services produced by immigrants. On the other hand, local workers 
tend to lose: their salaries tend to decrease and unemployment may 
increase.  
 
Migrations benefit the immigrants and the country of destination, not 
necessarily the country left behind. Of course, there are serious doubts 
about whether migration, by itself, is an important factor in socio-
economic convergence on our planet. Current labor migrations coexist 
with the progressive distancing of developed economies with respect to 
those of poor countries. The agrarian sector is very important in most 
poor countries. From that rural world emerges the most numerous 
contingent of emigrants towards the more fortunate countries either 
directly, or by stopping off first at one of its shambling cities. 
Meanwhile, these countries find it difficult to sell their agricultural 
products in developed countries, principally Europe, where agriculture 
is protected by subsidies and tariff barriers.  
 
Sooner or later, what is left for the poorer countries is to allow their 
people to leave – with the hope that they will send money home if they 
find work in wealthy countries – or negotiate concessions with 
multinational corporations to build factories, or extract natural 
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resources, while exploiting the labor force that is left behind by 
migrants or comes from even poorer countries.  
 
Contrary to the situation in the USA described by Martin (2005), in 
Spain the price of labor is not a function of supply, since salaries have 
risen moderately while the volume of the employed work force has 
grown substantially, as the empirical curve that results from the 
crossing of these variables shows (figure 12). 
 
Therefore, in Spain, instead of a reduction in the price of labor as a 
result of the employment of many immigrants (v. supra, figure 12), we 
witnessed until the end of 2008 a rising demand for workers that 
stabilizes the price of labor. In technical terms, the labor supply in the 
labor market of Spain since the beginning of the 21st century, up to the 
current recession, shows an infinite elasticity because it does not 
strictly depend upon its price. The arrival of workers from foreign 
countries is not modulated by variations in the price of labor within 
Spain, but by the enormous difference in salaries between Spain and 
the countries of origin. In other words: for an immigrant, it is a job and 
not necessarily the salary that is important (figure 13). 
 
 
6. Immigrant labor integration 
 
Work with dignity promotes not only the worker but also his 
surroundings. Work constitutes the principal place for the integration of 
immigrants. The insertion of immigrants into the job market is worth all 
of the effort of crossing one or more national borders. The society left 
behind by immigrants, and the receiving society as well as their family, 
need a job market that has the necessary conditions for the integration 
of immigrants without having to suffer excessive trauma. Recent 
immigrants should be protected against job offers that are in violation of 
labor laws of the countries where they find themselves.  
 
International immigration is not merely a private contract between an 
employer and a foreign employee. Immigration has a social dimension: 
the integration of immigrants, which can be accomplished by means of 
laws that fight racism and discrimination in the receiving country. 
Education and training are critical elements of integration and can be 
evaluated by looking at the results of education of immigrants and their 
offspring (recognition and validation of foreign diplomas, etc.). Young 
immigrants find it more difficult to begin working than their native-born 
counterparts. However, native-borns enter the job market later in life 
than immigrants, because their average education period lasts longer.  
The length of time spent in the receiving country is a positive 
integration factor. At the same time, the country and culture of the 
country of origin do not appear to be indifferent.  
 
 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
 
 
With an ageing population, the native labor pool will stagnate or even 
shrink in OECD countries over the next three decades. Therefore, the 
capacity for mobilizing all human resources at hand has become an 
economic challenge of the first magnitude. For reasons of social 
cohesion as well, in many developed countries it is imperative to 
facilitate the entry of foreign workers into the labor market. 
Governments must then adequately inform their citizens of the true 
costs and benefits of immigration and the justification of the political 
measures that are adopted. In this way, many stereotypes and fears 
about immigration can be avoided.  
 
Increasingly, regardless of their marital status, women emigrate to find 
work in foreign countries. In Spain, this phenomenon is clearly evident 
among women of Latin American origin. In other communities, such as 
Moroccans, women may accompany a husband or join him after a few 
years, to work in the home and raise her children. But, independent 
from these differences, immigrant women work more outside of the 
home than European women do.  
 
Domestic work is one of the more frequent occupations for immigrants. 
In Europe and Japan, the demand for domestic workers is rooted on the 
rise of female employment in the receiving countries, on changes in 
family structure and on population ageing. Hiring domestic workers is a 
very common practice to provide care for children and the elderly at 
home. In Greece, Italy, and Spain some 10% of foreign workers labor in 
homes. This sector is prone to irregular employment, since, until very 
recently, the usual procedures for recruiting domestic workers relied on 
personal and national/ethnic networks.  
 
The number of self-employed immigrants is steadily growing. 
Sometimes, self-employment is a solution to a lack of employment by 
others. Whatever the cause, the truth is that this phenomenon is 
considered very positive. With few exceptions, self-employment – ethnic 
entrepreneurship – refers to the property of a small family business that 
fulfils the needs of an immigrant population. If the business prospers, 
family members can be substituted by fellow countrymen or nationals. 
There are many kinds of ethnic businesses, some of which require a 
sizeable initial investment. Restaurants and specialized or very 
economical shops attract compatriots and tourists since they are 
usually located in central areas that are more or less abandoned. 
According to OECD (2004) data, immigrant self employment has 
increased over the last five years in all member-states, with the 
exception of Belgium and France. Self employment among women is 
also growing among immigrants.  
 
 
 35 
7. Migration Policies 
 
As in so many other aspects, the EU is leading efforts to create a truly 
international migration policy. In a gathering of the Council of Europe 
in Tampere (1999), four fundamental points related to asylum and 
immigration policy in Europe were laid down: 1) treaties with countries 
of origin; 2) fair treatment of citizens of third countries; 3) the 
management of migration flows; and 4) a common platform for the 
treatment of refugees. Moreover, Article 13 of the Cotonou Treaty, 
signed in Benin with 77 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP), summarizes  the characteristics of sustainable migration policies: 
a) guaranteeing  fundamental rights to legal immigrants and avoid all 
discrimination; b) supporting economic and social development of less-
favored partners, including training of ACP professionals in the EU and 
the teaching of ACP students in the EU; c) establishing a common front 
against irregular immigration and  exploitation, while articulating the 
re-admission of repatriated irregular immigrants. At Seville in 2002, the 
Council of Europe issued reccommendations for the integration of 
political asylum policies in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 
1951.  
 
While the supra-national organizations, such as the EU, get involved 
even more in the management of migration, regional and municipal 
governments are playing a fundamental role in the processes of 
immigrant integration. European regional parliaments are investing 
millions of euros in funding the integration of foreigners: the 
Autonomous Community of Madrid, for example, approved the spending 
of 4.5 million euros on integration projects for the 2004-2008 period). It 
is a fact too, that regions want to decide upon the admission of 
foreigners.  Some governments want to channel international migration, 
especially highly skilled immigrants towards regions other than the 
larger urban centers, and thereby stimulate local development. It is 
debated whether or not the excessive concentration of immigrants in 
large urban areas is a cause of excessive ethnic segregation. It can be 
affirmed that the concentration of immigrants in large urban zones 
generates undesired pressures upon the public social services while 
creating negative external reaction (OECD 2005).  
 
Migration towards Europe is an unstoppable process that relates to 
profound socioeconomic and demographic dynamics. When the 
demographic vacuum can only be filled with persons of a different 
mentality, it can be understood that it is necessary to establish certain 
principles of cooperation between all the states, regions, and individuals 
involved. For instance, if there are groups of immigrants who, without 
abandoning any element of their identity or customs of their country of 
origin, are trying to negotiate their presence in the receiving society as 
ethnic, racial, or religious minorities, it is urgent to set into place 
political measures and popular consciousness that would secure the 
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harmonious integration of the immigrant population, beyond those 
merely opposing the evils of racism and xenophobia.  
 
It is necessary to issue integration policies, but not the ones that are 
totally rigid and inflexible. The freedom of people and the creativity of 
future generations will find solutions that, for us, are impossible to 
imagine.  
 
 
8. Spanish Coda  
 
Up to the current recession, immigration in Europe, and especially in 
Spain, has increased the size of the work force and has introduced a 
greater flexibility and dynamism in the labor market. As a result of 
immigration over six years Spain has increased its population by an 
amount equal to the entire population of Ireland. Spain has attracted 
immigrants because of its uninterrupted growth over more than 12 
years. Foreign residents have been responsible for 100% of the growth 
of the active population of Spain between 2001 and 2006. In addition, 
the immigrant population has a higher rate of employment than that of 
the native-born. As a result of these two phenomena, affirmed the 
governor of the Bank of Spain (Fernández Ordóñez, 2007), immigration 
to Spain has been responsible for a third of GDP growth since the 
beginning of the century. This proportion would be even greater if there 
were taken into account certain indirect effects of the arrival of 
immigrants, which could be a greater participation of Spanish women in 
the labor market, resulting from the employment of immigrants in the 
care of the infants, the elderly and the sick.  
 
The arrival of immigrants acts as a cushion for the rise in salaries 
that typically takes place in periods of economic growth. Besides, since 
immigrants move more easily than the native-born, they facilitate the 
adjustment of the labor force to changes in the structural conditions of 
the labor market. Periods of more intense and prolonged economic 
growth can be maintained, if proper migration policies are formulated. 
In the words used by Kofi Annan to the European Parliament, “If 
immigrants need to come to Europe, Europe needs these immigrants. If 
Europe closes itself off, it will be less caring, poorer, weaker, and older”. 
The right management of the phenomenon of migration favors social 
and economic stability and aids in controlling possible inflationary 
episodes. 
 
In Spain, between 1996 and 2004, some 450,000 foreigners were 
“regularized” in several government campaigns. In 2005, some 600,000 
people were “normalized” with the conditions of having an employment 
contract and registration into the social security system. In order to 
avoid these amnesties in the future, the Spanish government has 
decided upon contracting workers in their place of origin as a more 
common method of obtaining a residence permit for Spain. Some 
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200,000 obtained it by this method in 2007. For contracting workers, 
Spain has made agreements with Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican 
Republic, Morocco, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Mauritania. It has 
also signed agreements on pilot programs with El Salvador, Honduras 
and Argentina, as well as Senegal and the Philippines.  
  
Despite these initiatives towards establishing order, illegal immigration 
persists. In some cases, it has taken a dramatic turn such as the arrival 
of Sub-Saharan Africans in the Canary Islands in frail watercraft from 
the shores of Mauritania and Senegal. In 2006, more than 31,000 
immigrants used this route. In 2007, the number dropped to 12,000 
following the reinforcement of vigilance on the African shore provided by 
the FRONTEX forces of the European Union. With respect to the total 
number of “undocumented” residents in Spain, numbers ranging from 
300.000 to 500,000 are estimated. 
 
 
9. Epilogue. European unemployment during the current recession 
(2008-2011)  
 
To facilitate comparisons, four EU countries with the largest population 
and economic weight (Germany, France, UK and Italy) were selected, 
along with three other countries that, together with Spain, are part of 
the European periphery (Greece, Portugal and Ireland). The 
unemployment rates of these eight countries declined, with some 
exceptions, over the period 2001-2007, reaching during the final year 
the 8% figure, although some countries had rates well below this value 
(Ireland, less than half; Italy, 6% ; UK, just over 5%). After 2007, 
however, there were three very different groups: In countries with 
greater weight, unemployment rates hover around 8% (Germany 7.4%, 
France 9.3%, UK 7.7%, and Italy 8.5%); in Greece (10%), Portugal 
(10%), Ireland (11.8%) unemployment rates grew significantly and, 
finally, in Spain, the unemployment rates soared (18%).  The 
Spanish Statistical Bureau (INE) published 4.32 million people 
unemployed (1.12 million more than a year before) for the fourth 
quarter of 2009 –a 19% unemployment rate.  According to the same 
source, in 2009, the sector most affected by unemployment has been 
the construction sector, where the number of jobs falls by 378,100 
people (-17.34%).  In decreasing order appear the industrial sector 
(361,700 people: -11.89%), services (449,900 people: -3.25%) and 
agriculture (21,200 people: -2.64%). 
 
Following the severe contraction of the European labor market, explicit 
(and implicit) policies have been made for discouraging the arrival of 
new foreign workers that, for the time being, would not find suitable 
employment in Europe: for instance, temporarily requiring the condition 
of having a job offer for those positions that currently don’t require it. In 
other cases, governments have taken steps to present cyclical 
migrations more attractive to immigrants: that would allow workers to 
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return to their countries of origin in times of economic slowdown, while 
they would return to host countries in times of economic prosperity. 
Labor market controls have been established to help both low-skilled 
native workers, and immigrants already settled in the host country. 
Most EU countries, like UK, have also tightened the criteria for 
admission, revising and raising the point’s admission system, especially 
for unskilled workers, thereby restricting their entry. In the case of 
highly skilled workers, a master's degree and a minimum £20,000 
salary are required. Other European countries have taken more radical 
measures. Italy passed legislation criminalizing illegal immigration and 
preventing unauthorized migrants from accessing public services. In 
addition, civilian patrols assisting the police regarding illegal 
immigration were authorized. France, meanwhile, has conducted a 
series of raids against illegal employment, in order to move irregular 
jobs to unemployed legal workers. 
 
The Czech Republic, like Spain, is offering a series of economic benefits 
to some foreign workers, in exchange for their promise of no returning 
for some period of time or even indefinitely. In an economic recession it 
is more than reasonable the effort of trying to counter the inertia of 
migration flows, that were set in a totally different situation. However, 
just the expulsion or forced return of immigrants already installed in 
Europe would be a disproportionate, arbitrary, and ultimately 
impoverishing measure. Europe needs most of the people who have 
moved into its territory in the last twenty years, contributing to its 
demographic, economic and sociocultural growth. Eventually, all these 
programs have had little success, because of the benefits and 
advantages of staying, despite being unemployed, are much higher than 
those found in their home countries. 
  
For its part, the United Kingdom and France are experimenting with a 
variation of this concept: providing help to immigrants even before they 
arrive. Thus, both governments announced in July 2009 that would 
offer a plane ticket back home, 2,000 Euros in cash, and support and 
advice for relocation, to those immigrants who, being in Calais waiting 
to enter illegally in the United Kingdom, would desire so. 
 
European immigration froze from the very moment the global recession 
affected the most dynamic countries in the sub-continent. It is likely 
that it will resume once the recession is over. Meanwhile, nobody wants 
to leave Europe, figuring out new strategies6 to survive until the 
recovery from the crisis takes place. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Some foreign workers move from construction to agriculture, domestic service and services to face 
economic crisis, looking for new employment opportunities. Immigrant families went back to home-
sharing, as is way to cut down expenses in the host country. There is evidence, too,  that some immigrants 
are helped to stay by their family members in their country of origin (López-Sala and Ferrero-
Turrión, 2011). 
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